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EXPLANATORY  MEMORANDUM 
1 •  GIJne.r.aJ _c.onsJdo r.a.t1.oru1. 
. ·1  .  The  Second  Counc I I  DIrectIve  on  company  I  aw  of  13  December  1977 
(77/91/EEC)1  harmonizes  the  safeguards  required  by  Member  States  of 
companies  In  respect  of  the  formation  of  public  limited  liability 
companies  and  the  maintenance  and  alteration of  their  capital,  with 
a  view  to making  such  safeguards equivalent. 
2. 
3. 
In  order  to  protect  the  Interests  both_  of  shareholders  and  of  third 
parties,  the  Directive  provides  that  It  should  be  possible _for  any 
Interested  person  to-acquaint  himself  with  the  basic  particulars of 
a  company  at  the  time  of  Its  Incorporation,  Including  the  exact 
composition  of  Its  capital.  The  Directive  also  makes  provision  for 
ma 1  nta In I  ng  the  subscrIbed  capIta I  and  ensurIng  mIn I  mum  equ Iva I  ent 
protection  for  shareholders  and  creditors  In  the  event  of  an 
Increase or  reduction of  that  capital. 
To  ensure  that. the  subscr-1 bed  capIta I  Is  maIntaIned,  the  DIrect 1  ve 
prohibits  the  distribution  of  dividends  to  shareholders  In  the 
absence.  of  net  profIts  and  restrIcts  the.  r .I ght  of  a  company  to 
acquire  Its own  shares. 
In  this  connection,  It  lays  down.more  particularly  the  conditions 
under  which  Member  States'  laws  may  authorize  companies  to  acquire 
their  own  shares.  Thus  with  the  twofold  aim  of  ensuring maintenance 
of  the  subscribed  capital  and  guaranteeing  respect  for  the  principle 
of  equal  treatment  for  alI  shareholders,  the  Second  Directive 
Imposes  restrictions  of both  a  procedural  and  a  substantive  nature. 
It  also spells out  the  consequences  of  such  transactions.  · 
From  the  procedural  point  of  view,  It  Is  for  the  general  meeting  to 
authorize  proposed  acquisitions  and  determine  the  terms  and 
conditions  thereof,  Including  the  duration  of  the  period  for  which 
the  authorization  Is  given,  which  may  not  exceed  18  months 
(Article  19(1)(a)).  However,  the  Directive  allows  Member  States  to 
derogate  from  the  principle  of  authorization  by  the  general  meeting 
"where  the  acquisition  of  a  company's  own  shares  Is  necessary  to 
prevent  ser lous  and  Imminent  harm  to  the  company"  (Art lcle  19(2). 
In  such  a  case,  the  decision  may  be  taken  by  the  company's  board, 
which  must  subsequently  Inform  the general  meeting  thereof. 
Whichever  organ  Is  competent  to  take  decisions  In  relation  to  the 
transactions  In  question,  a  number  of  substantive  restrictions  are 
also  Imposed.  A  public  limited  liability  company  may  under  no 
circumstances  acquire  Its  own  shares  In  excess  of  10%  of  the 
subscribed capital,  and  only  fully  paid  up  shares may  be  Included  In 
the  transaction  (Article  19(1)(b)  and  (d)).  Moreover,  the  Directive 
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stipulates  that  the  voting  rights attached  to  the shares  acquired  by 
the  company  must  be  suspended  (Article 22(1)).  Lastly,  the 
transaction  must  be  mentioned  In  the  company's  annual  report 
(Article  22(2)). 
4.  All  the  above  rules  apply  not  only  to  acquisitions  made  by  the 
publ lc  I lmlted  liability company  Itself,  but  also  to  those  made  by  a 
person  acting  In  his own  name  but  on  the  company's  behalf. 
on  the other  hand,  the  Directive  does  not  apply  to acquisitions  by  a 
subsidiary.  But  It  Is  entirely  feasible  that,  by  virtue  of  Its 
power  of  control,  a  company  might  use  a  subsidiary  to  acquire  Its 
own  shares,  thereby  circumventing  the  safeguards provided  for  In  the 
Second  Directive.  In  view  of  this  gap  In  Community  law,  national 
laws  continue  to deal  with  this matter  In  a  variety of  ways. 
5.  The  lack  of  Community  rules on  the subject  has  also  raised  qu'estlons 
In  connect lon  with  the  Commission's  declared  policy  of  removing 
obstacles  to  takeover  bids. 
-LL should.  be--stressed  __ thaL the  Commlsslo~·s  aim  __In_  rem~'!'.U:!9  _such 
obstacles  Is  not  to  encourage  takeover  bids  as  ends  In  themselves. 
The  Commission's  standpoint  Is  rather  that,  In  general,  takeover 
bids  may  be  viewed  In  a  positive  light  In  so  far  as  they  encourage 
the  selection by  market  forces  of  the  most  competitive companies  and 
the  restructuring of  European  companies,  Indispensable  as  this  Is  to 
meeting  International  competition.  In  this  context,  the 
opportunities  for  acquiring  companies  must  be  broadly  similar  from 
one  Member  State  to  another. 
6.  In  several  Member  States,  however,  takeover  bids  resisted  by  the 
board  of  the  target  company  (hostIle  bids)  have  no  chance  of 
success,  owing  to  the  defensive  measures  which  the  company's  board 
can  take  under  national  law  to  ensure  that  control  of  the  company 
remains  In  the  hands  of  "friendly"  shareholders. 
7.  In  Its  communI cat I  on  to  the  Counc I I  of  10  May  of  thIs  year, 2  the 
Commission  outlined  the  measures  It  Intends  putting  forward  with  a 
view  to  removing  obstacles  to  takeover  bids. 
8.  The  purpose  of  the  measures  Is,  generally  speaking,  to  attain  a 
higher  degree  of  democracy  In  companies  and  Increase  shareholder 
Involvement  In  company  life.  This  strengthening  of  the  power  of 
shareholders  Is  of  particular  Importance  In  the  context  of  a 
takeover  bid  as  these  new  measures  wl  I I  ensure  that  the  outcome  of 
the  bid  Is  decided  by  all  shareholders acting  Independently  and  with 
ful 1  knowledge  of  the  facts. 
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9.  The  proposed  measures  cover  two  categories  of  obstacle.  The  first 
category  concerns  the  voting  rights  of  shareholders,  and  the  second 
the  maintenance  of  company  capital. 
10.  The  obstacles  relating  to  the  exercise  of  shareholders'  v~tlng 
rights  wl  I I,  for  their  part,  be  dealt  with  In  the  amended  proposal 
for  a  Fifth  Directive,  which .already  contains  Important  provisions 
on  the  subject.  However,  with  a  vlew·to  strengthening  the  position 
of  shareholders  with  regard  to  the  exercise  of  their  voting  rights, 
those  provisions  need  to  be  amended  In  several  respects.  A new  text 
amending  the  proposal  for  a  Fifth Directive  along  those  lines  has 
accordingly  been  drawn  up. 
11  .  The  capIta I  maIntenance  aspect  I  nvo I  ves  obstac I  es 
acqu 1  sIt I  on  by  a  company  of  Its  own  shares.  By 
company  seeks  to  shield  a  certain  proportion  of 
capital  from  a  hostile  bidder  and  freeze  the  voting 
thereto with  a  view  to  frustrating  the  bid. 
II nked  to  the 
such  means  the 
Its  subscrIbed 
rights  attached 
12.  Firstly,  mention  must  be  made  of  -the  right  to  derogate  under 
certain  condltlons.-f.r:om  ___ the. p_rlnclple  of  the  authorization.  of  the  ______ _ 
general  meeting,  which  allows  the  board  of  a. company  to  acquire  up 
to  10%  of  the  subscribed  capital  without  any  Intervention  by  .the 
shareholders,  the  addressees of  the  bid. 
13.  1 t  Is  therefore  necessary  to  no  longer  a I low  recourse  to  be  had  to 
this  derogation  for  ~ny  acquisition  of  own  shares  during  the 
takeover  bid  period.  In  this connection,  It  was  made  clear  when  the 
Thirteenth  Council  Directive,  concerning  takeover  blds,3  was 
amended  that  Article 8  thereof,  which  requires  the  board  to  refrain 
from  taking  certain  defensive  measures  while  a  bid  Is  open,  appl les 
also  to  the  acquisition  of  the  company's  own  shares.  Hence, 
notwithstanding  Article 19(1)(a)  and  (2)  of  the  Second  Directive, 
such  an  acquisition  Is  subject  to  the  authorization  of  the  general 
meeting,  which  must  be  ~lven during  the  period  for  acceptance of  the 
bid. 
14.  The  second  facet  Is  that  of  the  posslbllllty  for  shares  In  a  parent 
company  to  be  acquired  by  Its subsidiaries. 
In  view  of  the  lack  of  Community  rules  on  the  subject,  there. Is 
nothing  to  prevent  a  company  from  using  a  subsidiary  ..  to  acquire  Its 
own  shares  In  order  to  defend  Itself  against  a  hostIle  takeover  bid. 
In  this way,  the  restrictions on  the  acquisition of  own  shares  laid 
down  In  the  Second  Directive  might  be  breached.  Thus  asubsldlary 
could  acquire  shares  even  beyond  the  threshold  of  10%  of  the 
subscribed  capital  of  the  parent  company  and  exercise  the  voting 
rights carried  by  those  shares. 
3  OJ  C  240,  26.9.1990,  p.  7. 
.  . 
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15.  1 t  must  therefore  be  ensured  that  the  restrIct Ions  pI aced  on  the 
acquisition  of  own  shares  apply  also  to  acquisitions  made  by 
subsidiaries. 
11.  Commentary 
16.  The  purpose  of  Article  1 of  this Directive  Is  to extend  the  scope  of 
Articles  19  to  24  of  the  Second  Directive  so  as  to  Include  the 
acquisition  of  shares  In  a  parent  company  by  a  subsidiary.  Hence  a 
subsidiary  would  be  able  to  acquire  shares  In  Its  parent  only  under 
the  same  conditions as  the  latter. 
Such  extension means  notably  that: 
(a)  In  calculating  the  maximum  number  of  shares  which  may  be  held 
by  a  company  (10%),  shares  held  by  all  subsidiaries  wl  I I  be 
added  to  those  held  by  the  parent; 
(b)  the  voting  rights attached  to shares  In  a  parent  company  held 
by  Its subsidiaries  wl  II  also be  suspended. 
In  short,  In  extending  the  arrangements  provided  for  In  the 
Second  Directive,  the  transaction whereby  shares  In  a  parent  company 
are  acquired  by  a  subsidiary must  be  viewed  In  the  same  way  as  If  It 
were  an  acquisition of  shares  by  the  parent  company  Itself. 
This  extension  does  not  affect  the  legal  nature  of  the  above 
provisions.  They  are  minimum  provisions  which  permit  ~ember States 
to  Impose  more  severe  restrictions on  the  transactions  In  question. 
17.  For  the  purposes  of  this  Directive,  a  company  Is  deemed  to  be  a 
subsidiary  of  another  company  If  the  latter  satisfies  one  of  the 
following  requirements: 
(a)  It  holds  a  majority of  the  voting  rights  In  the  former;  or 
(b)  It  has  the  right  to  appoint  or  remove  a  majority  of  the 
dIrectors;  or 
(c)  the  right  to  control  by  Itself  a  majority  of  the  voting 
r lghts  pursuant  to  an  agreement  or  a  control  clause  In  the 
subsidiary's statutes. 
These  requirements  are  based  on  criteria appl led  by  other  Community 
legal  Instruments,  namely  Directive  83/349/EEC  of  13  June  1983  on 
consol ldated  accounts4  and  Directive  88/627/EEC  of  12  December  1988 
on  the  Information  to  be  publ lshed  when  a  major  holding  In  a  I lsted 
company  Is  acquired or  disposed of.5 
4  OJ  L 193,  18.7. 1983,  p.  1 . 
5  OJ  L  348,  17. 1  2. 1988,  p.  62. - 6  -
Proposal  for  a  Council  Directive  amending 
Directive 77/91/EEC 
on  the  formation of  public  limited  lla.blllty companies 
and  the maintenance  and  alteration of 
their  capital 
THE  COUNCIL  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES, 
Having  regard  to  the  Treaty establishing  the  European  Economic  Community, 
and  In  particular Article 54  thereof, 
Having  regard  to  the  proposal  from  the  Commission, 
In  cooperation with  the  European  Pari lament, 
Having  regard  to  the opinion of  the  Economic  and  Social  Committee, 
Whereas  In  order  to  maintain  the  subscrt"bed  capital  and  ensure  equal 
-treatment  of  shareholders,  Directive  TU91/EEC1  limits  the  right  of.  a 
company  to  acquire  Its own  shares; 
Whereas  ths  restrictions on  the  acquisition of  own  shares  apply  not  only 
to  acquIsItIons  made  by  the  company  I tse If but  a I  so  to  those  made  by  a 
person  acting  In  his own  name  but  on  the  company's  behalf; 
Whereas  a  subsidiary  company  does  not  enjoy  true  Independence  In 
determining  Its  line  of  action;  whereas  l.n  order  to  prevent  a  company 
from  using  a  subsidiary  to  make  such  acquisitions  without  regard  to  the 
restrictions  Imposed  In  that  respect,  the  arrangements  concerning  the 
acquisition  by  a  company  of  Its  own  shares  should  be  extended  to  cover 
the  acquisition of  a  company's  shares  by  a  subsidiary, 
HAS  ADOPTED  THIS  DIRECTIVE: 
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Article 
The  DIrectIve  77/91 /CEE  of  the  Counc I I  Is  amended  as  fo I I  owIng:  a  new 
article  24bls  Is  added  after article 24. 
"Article  24bls 
1 .  A subs 1  d 1 ary  company  may  acquIre  shares  In  Its  parent  company  on I  y 
to  the  extent  that  the  latter  may  acquire  Its  own  shares  by  virtue 
of  provisions  adopted  pursuant  to  Articles 19  to  24.  For  the 
purposes  of  those  provlilons,  acquisitions  of  shares  In  the  parent 
company  by  Its subsidiaries shall  be  deemed  to  have  been  made  by  the 
parent  company. 
2.  For  the.  purposes  of  paragraph  1,  "subsidiary  company"  means  any 
company  In  which  another  company  (the  ~arent company) 
(a)  holds  a  major-Ity of  shar-eholders'  or  members'  voting  rights;  or 
(b)  has  the  right  to  appoint  or  remove  a  majority  of  the  members  of  the 
adm In I stratI ve,  management  or  supervIsory  body  and  Is  at  the  same 
time  a  shareholder  In  or  member  of  that  company;  or 
(c)  has  the  right  to  control  alone  a  maJority  of  shareholders'  or 
members'  voting  rights  pursuant  to  an  agreement  entered  Into  with 
other  shareholders  In  or  members  of  that  company  or  to  a  provision 
In  Its .statutes." - 8  -
Article  2 
1.  Member  States shal I  adopt  before  ......... the  laws,  regulations  and 
administrative  provisions  necessary  to  comply  with  this  Directive. 
They  shal 1  forthwith  Inform  the Commission  thereof. 
2.  The  date of  entry  Into  force  which  Member  States  lay  down  for  these 
provisions  shal I  be  not  later  than  ............  . 
3.  Member  States  shall  communicate  to  the  Commission  the  text  of  the 
main  provisions  of  national  law  which  they  adopt  In  the  field 
covered  by  this Directive. 
4.  When  Member  States  adopt  the  provisions,  the  latter  shal I  contain  a 
reference  to  this  Directive  or  shall  be  accompanied  by  such  a 
reference  at  the  time  of  their  official  publication.  The  methods  of 
making  such  a  reference  shal I  be  laid  down  by  the Member  States. - 9  -
8.rtlcle a 
This  Directive  Is  addressed  to  the Member  States. 
Done  at 
For  the  Counc I 1 
The  President Ef\I 
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